# ECDSA_threshold_code

**Repository Path**: cse-crypto/ECDSA_threshold_code

## Basic Information

- **Project Name**: ECDSA_threshold_code
- **Description**: the code of Multi-party threshold ECDSA signature protocol
- **Primary Language**: Unknown
- **License**: Not specified
- **Default Branch**: master
- **Homepage**: None
- **GVP Project**: No

## Statistics

- **Stars**: 6
- **Forks**: 1
- **Created**: 2023-02-21
- **Last Updated**: 2026-03-24

## Categories & Tags

**Categories**: Uncategorized

**Tags**: None

## README

# Multi-party threshold ECDSA signature protocol

#### Description
Multi-party collaborative digital signature has become a mature cryptographic solution for the mobile Internet. Whether at the application level such as blockchain or traditional financial institutions, threshold signature schemes can bring security and privacy improvements in various scenarios. Existing multi-party threshold ECDSA signatures need to adopt homomorphic encryption, inadvertent transmission, beaver multiplication triples and other cryptographic source languages to build a multi-party computing protocol that converts multiplication shares into additive shares (MtA), resulting in high computational overhead, communication overhead, and high storage overhead in the co-signature process, making it difficult to be widely used in actual systems. Therefore, how to reduce the computing overhead, communication overhead and storage overhead of operation under the premise of ensuring the security of multi-party threshold collaborative signature is one of the key technologies that need to be solved urgently in the current multi-party threshold ECDSA signature protocol.
The goal of this topic is to design a multi-party threshold ECDSA algorithm with multi-party participation (three parties and above) without constructing an MtA protocol based on complex cryptographic primitives, and instantiate it in a multi-party collaborative decision-making system based on digital signature, which has strong practical significance. In order to ensure security under the malicious adversary model, we introduce discrete logarithmic zero-knowledge proofs and verifiable secret sharing (such as Feldman VSS protocol or Pedersen VSS protocol) to ensure the reliability of all participants in the co-signing process. The main contributions of the work are as follows:
(1) A new secure and efficient multi-party threshold ECDSA collaborative signature scheme is designed, which only uses simple additive linear secret sharing and Shamir secret sharing to realize the signature calculation of multiple participants without disclosing their respective private key shares, and meet the correctness and efficiency requirements of multi-party collaborative signature.
(2) Based on discrete logarithmic zero-knowledge proof and verifiable secret sharing technology, the security under the malicious adversary model is realized, and the advantages of the proposed scheme in computing overhead and communication overhead are verified from theoretical analysis and experimental verification.
(3) Using the efficient multi-party threshold ECDSA collaborative signature algorithm, different host data interaction is realized through network connection, and the decision-making system based on collaborative signature and verification is realized.

#### Software Architecture
The program is divided into three parts.
1. Communication part Responsible for the interaction of parameters between different users.
2. Signature calculation part calculates the corresponding signature share and private key share based on the received user parameters.
3. Signature verification part is responsible for signature verification based on the user's signature share and private key share.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
#### Instructions
The user runs the esign.exe file, interacts with parameters between different users, and operates according to program prompts. The program implements a multi-party collaborative ECDSA protocol with four people performing the signature and three people performing the verification.