From a6ea0e430224dba69b845f623d5ad3f780be4766 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Lagerwall Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 09:16:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/19] xen/netback: Ensure protocol headers don't fall in the non-linear area stable inclusion from stable-v4.19 commit 44dfdecc288b8d5932e09f5e6a597a089d5a82b2 category: bugfix issue:#I670WE CVE: CVE-2022-3643 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ad7f402ae4f466647c3a669b8a6f3e5d4271c84a ] In some cases, the frontend may send a packet where the protocol headers are spread across multiple slots. This would result in netback creating an skb where the protocol headers spill over into the non-linear area. Some drivers and NICs don't handle this properly resulting in an interface reset or worse. This issue was introduced by the removal of an unconditional skb pull in the tx path to improve performance. Fix this without reintroducing the pull by setting up grant copy ops for as many slots as needed to reach the XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN size. Adjust the rest of the code to handle multiple copy operations per skb. This is XSA-423 / CVE-2022-3643. Fixes: 7e5d7753956b ("xen-netback: remove unconditional __pskb_pull_tail() in guest Tx path") Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 223 ++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 41bdfb684d46..1036d903038c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -323,10 +323,13 @@ static int xenvif_count_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct xenvif_tx_cb { - u16 pending_idx; + u16 copy_pending_idx[XEN_NETBK_LEGACY_SLOTS_MAX + 1]; + u8 copy_count; }; #define XENVIF_TX_CB(skb) ((struct xenvif_tx_cb *)(skb)->cb) +#define copy_pending_idx(skb, i) (XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->copy_pending_idx[i]) +#define copy_count(skb) (XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->copy_count) static inline void xenvif_tx_create_map_op(struct xenvif_queue *queue, u16 pending_idx, @@ -361,31 +364,93 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *xenvif_alloc_skb(unsigned int size) return skb; } -static struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, - struct sk_buff *skb, - struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp, - struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop, - unsigned int frag_overflow, - struct sk_buff *nskb) +static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct xen_netif_tx_request *first, + struct xen_netif_tx_request *txfrags, + unsigned *copy_ops, + unsigned *map_ops, + unsigned int frag_overflow, + struct sk_buff *nskb, + unsigned int extra_count, + unsigned int data_len) { struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb); skb_frag_t *frags = shinfo->frags; - u16 pending_idx = XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->pending_idx; - int start; + u16 pending_idx; pending_ring_idx_t index; unsigned int nr_slots; + struct gnttab_copy *cop = queue->tx_copy_ops + *copy_ops; + struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops + *map_ops; + struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp = first; + + nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + 1; + + copy_count(skb) = 0; + + /* Create copy ops for exactly data_len bytes into the skb head. */ + __skb_put(skb, data_len); + while (data_len > 0) { + int amount = data_len > txp->size ? txp->size : data_len; + + cop->source.u.ref = txp->gref; + cop->source.domid = queue->vif->domid; + cop->source.offset = txp->offset; + + cop->dest.domid = DOMID_SELF; + cop->dest.offset = (offset_in_page(skb->data + + skb_headlen(skb) - + data_len)) & ~XEN_PAGE_MASK; + cop->dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(skb->data + skb_headlen(skb) + - data_len); + + cop->len = amount; + cop->flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref; - nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags; + index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons); + pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; + callback_param(queue, pending_idx).ctx = NULL; + copy_pending_idx(skb, copy_count(skb)) = pending_idx; + copy_count(skb)++; + + cop++; + data_len -= amount; - /* Skip first skb fragment if it is on same page as header fragment. */ - start = (frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == pending_idx); + if (amount == txp->size) { + /* The copy op covered the full tx_request */ + + memcpy(&queue->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req, + txp, sizeof(*txp)); + queue->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].extra_count = + (txp == first) ? extra_count : 0; + + if (txp == first) + txp = txfrags; + else + txp++; + queue->pending_cons++; + nr_slots--; + } else { + /* The copy op partially covered the tx_request. + * The remainder will be mapped. + */ + txp->offset += amount; + txp->size -= amount; + } + } - for (shinfo->nr_frags = start; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; - shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) { + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; + shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; - xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, 0, gop); + xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, + txp == first ? extra_count : 0, gop); frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[shinfo->nr_frags], pending_idx); + + if (txp == first) + txp = txfrags; + else + txp++; } if (frag_overflow) { @@ -406,7 +471,8 @@ static struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *que skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; } - return gop; + (*copy_ops) = cop - queue->tx_copy_ops; + (*map_ops) = gop - queue->tx_map_ops; } static inline void xenvif_grant_handle_set(struct xenvif_queue *queue, @@ -442,7 +508,7 @@ static int xenvif_tx_check_gop(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct gnttab_copy **gopp_copy) { struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop_map = *gopp_map; - u16 pending_idx = XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->pending_idx; + u16 pending_idx; /* This always points to the shinfo of the skb being checked, which * could be either the first or the one on the frag_list */ @@ -453,24 +519,37 @@ static int xenvif_tx_check_gop(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct skb_shared_info *first_shinfo = NULL; int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags; const bool sharedslot = nr_frags && - frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == pending_idx; + frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == + copy_pending_idx(skb, copy_count(skb) - 1); int i, err; - /* Check status of header. */ - err = (*gopp_copy)->status; - if (unlikely(err)) { - if (net_ratelimit()) - netdev_dbg(queue->vif->dev, - "Grant copy of header failed! status: %d pending_idx: %u ref: %u\n", - (*gopp_copy)->status, - pending_idx, - (*gopp_copy)->source.u.ref); - /* The first frag might still have this slot mapped */ - if (!sharedslot) - xenvif_idx_release(queue, pending_idx, - XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR); + for (i = 0; i < copy_count(skb); i++) { + int newerr; + + /* Check status of header. */ + pending_idx = copy_pending_idx(skb, i); + + newerr = (*gopp_copy)->status; + if (likely(!newerr)) { + /* The first frag might still have this slot mapped */ + if (i < copy_count(skb) - 1 || !sharedslot) + xenvif_idx_release(queue, pending_idx, + XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY); + } else { + err = newerr; + if (net_ratelimit()) + netdev_dbg(queue->vif->dev, + "Grant copy of header failed! status: %d pending_idx: %u ref: %u\n", + (*gopp_copy)->status, + pending_idx, + (*gopp_copy)->source.u.ref); + /* The first frag might still have this slot mapped */ + if (i < copy_count(skb) - 1 || !sharedslot) + xenvif_idx_release(queue, pending_idx, + XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR); + } + (*gopp_copy)++; } - (*gopp_copy)++; check_frags: for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++, gop_map++) { @@ -517,14 +596,6 @@ static int xenvif_tx_check_gop(struct xenvif_queue *queue, if (err) continue; - /* First error: if the header haven't shared a slot with the - * first frag, release it as well. - */ - if (!sharedslot) - xenvif_idx_release(queue, - XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->pending_idx, - XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY); - /* Invalidate preceding fragments of this skb. */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[j]); @@ -794,7 +865,6 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue, unsigned *copy_ops, unsigned *map_ops) { - struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops; struct sk_buff *skb, *nskb; int ret; unsigned int frag_overflow; @@ -876,8 +946,12 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue, continue; } + data_len = (txreq.size > XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN) ? + XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN : txreq.size; + ret = xenvif_count_requests(queue, &txreq, extra_count, txfrags, work_to_do); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) break; @@ -903,9 +977,8 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue, index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; - data_len = (txreq.size > XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN && - ret < XEN_NETBK_LEGACY_SLOTS_MAX) ? - XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN : txreq.size; + if (ret >= XEN_NETBK_LEGACY_SLOTS_MAX - 1 && data_len < txreq.size) + data_len = txreq.size; skb = xenvif_alloc_skb(data_len); if (unlikely(skb == NULL)) { @@ -916,8 +989,6 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ret; - if (data_len < txreq.size) - skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++; /* At this point shinfo->nr_frags is in fact the number of * slots, which can be as large as XEN_NETBK_LEGACY_SLOTS_MAX. */ @@ -979,54 +1050,19 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue, type); } - XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->pending_idx = pending_idx; - - __skb_put(skb, data_len); - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].source.u.ref = txreq.gref; - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].source.domid = queue->vif->domid; - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].source.offset = txreq.offset; - - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].dest.u.gmfn = - virt_to_gfn(skb->data); - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].dest.domid = DOMID_SELF; - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].dest.offset = - offset_in_page(skb->data) & ~XEN_PAGE_MASK; - - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].len = data_len; - queue->tx_copy_ops[*copy_ops].flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref; - - (*copy_ops)++; - - if (data_len < txreq.size) { - frag_set_pending_idx(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0], - pending_idx); - xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, &txreq, - extra_count, gop); - gop++; - } else { - frag_set_pending_idx(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0], - INVALID_PENDING_IDX); - memcpy(&queue->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req, - &txreq, sizeof(txreq)); - queue->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].extra_count = - extra_count; - } - - queue->pending_cons++; - - gop = xenvif_get_requests(queue, skb, txfrags, gop, - frag_overflow, nskb); + xenvif_get_requests(queue, skb, &txreq, txfrags, copy_ops, + map_ops, frag_overflow, nskb, extra_count, + data_len); __skb_queue_tail(&queue->tx_queue, skb); queue->tx.req_cons = idx; - if (((gop-queue->tx_map_ops) >= ARRAY_SIZE(queue->tx_map_ops)) || + if ((*map_ops >= ARRAY_SIZE(queue->tx_map_ops)) || (*copy_ops >= ARRAY_SIZE(queue->tx_copy_ops))) break; } - (*map_ops) = gop - queue->tx_map_ops; return; } @@ -1105,9 +1141,8 @@ static int xenvif_tx_submit(struct xenvif_queue *queue) while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&queue->tx_queue)) != NULL) { struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp; u16 pending_idx; - unsigned data_len; - pending_idx = XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->pending_idx; + pending_idx = copy_pending_idx(skb, 0); txp = &queue->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req; /* Check the remap error code. */ @@ -1126,18 +1161,6 @@ static int xenvif_tx_submit(struct xenvif_queue *queue) continue; } - data_len = skb->len; - callback_param(queue, pending_idx).ctx = NULL; - if (data_len < txp->size) { - /* Append the packet payload as a fragment. */ - txp->offset += data_len; - txp->size -= data_len; - } else { - /* Schedule a response immediately. */ - xenvif_idx_release(queue, pending_idx, - XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY); - } - if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_csum_blank) skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; else if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_data_validated) @@ -1314,7 +1337,7 @@ static inline void xenvif_tx_dealloc_action(struct xenvif_queue *queue) /* Called after netfront has transmitted */ int xenvif_tx_action(struct xenvif_queue *queue, int budget) { - unsigned nr_mops, nr_cops = 0; + unsigned nr_mops = 0, nr_cops = 0; int work_done, ret; if (unlikely(!tx_work_todo(queue))) -- Gitee From e4a458080a81a05396ecb3b5fcadfa9a16edc2e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxim Mikityanskiy Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 00:27:18 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 02/19] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_reassemble_sdu stable inclusion from stable-v4.19 commit 6c7407bfbeafc80a04e6eaedcf34d378532a04f2 category: bugfix issue:#I67146 CVE: CVE-2022-3564 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 3aff8aaca4e36dc8b17eaa011684881a80238966 ] Fix the race condition between the following two flows that run in parallel: 1. l2cap_reassemble_sdu -> chan->ops->recv (l2cap_sock_recv_cb) -> __sock_queue_rcv_skb. 2. bt_sock_recvmsg -> skb_recv_datagram, skb_free_datagram. An SKB can be queued by the first flow and immediately dequeued and freed by the second flow, therefore the callers of l2cap_reassemble_sdu can't use the SKB after that function returns. However, some places continue accessing struct l2cap_ctrl that resides in the SKB's CB for a short time after l2cap_reassemble_sdu returns, leading to a use-after-free condition (the stack trace is below, line numbers for kernel 5.19.8). Fix it by keeping a local copy of struct l2cap_ctrl. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812025f2f0 by task kworker/u17:3/43169 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4)) print_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:314 mm/kasan/report.c:429) ? l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:162 mm/kasan/report.c:493) ? l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth l2cap_rx (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7236 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7271) bluetooth ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306) Allocated by task 43169: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:39) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:45 mm/kasan/common.c:436 mm/kasan/common.c:469) kmem_cache_alloc_node (mm/slab.h:750 mm/slub.c:3243 mm/slub.c:3293) __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:414) l2cap_recv_frag (./include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h:425 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8329) bluetooth l2cap_recv_acldata (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8442) bluetooth hci_rx_work (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3642 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3832) bluetooth process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:2289) worker_thread (./include/linux/list.h:292 kernel/workqueue.c:2437) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:376) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306) Freed by task 27920: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:39) kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:45) kasan_set_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:372) ____kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:368 mm/kasan/common.c:328) slab_free_freelist_hook (mm/slub.c:1780) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:3536 mm/slub.c:3553) skb_free_datagram (./include/net/sock.h:1578 ./include/net/sock.h:1639 net/core/datagram.c:323) bt_sock_recvmsg (net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:295) bluetooth l2cap_sock_recvmsg (net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1212) bluetooth sock_read_iter (net/socket.c:1087) new_sync_read (./include/linux/fs.h:2052 fs/read_write.c:401) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:482) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:620) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/CAKErNvoqga1WcmoR3-0875esY6TVWFQDandbVZncSiuGPBQXLA@mail.gmail.com/T/#u Fixes: d2a7ac5d5d3a ("Bluetooth: Add the ERTM receive state machine") Fixes: 4b51dae96731 ("Bluetooth: Add streaming mode receive and incoming packet classifier") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: gaochao --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index e2ebd0424e02..7565a2da1ce8 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -6211,6 +6211,7 @@ static int l2cap_rx_state_recv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct l2cap_ctrl *control, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 event) { + struct l2cap_ctrl local_control; int err = 0; bool skb_in_use = false; @@ -6235,15 +6236,32 @@ static int l2cap_rx_state_recv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, chan->buffer_seq = chan->expected_tx_seq; skb_in_use = true; + /* l2cap_reassemble_sdu may free skb, hence invalidate + * control, so make a copy in advance to use it after + * l2cap_reassemble_sdu returns and to avoid the race + * condition, for example: + * + * The current thread calls: + * l2cap_reassemble_sdu + * chan->ops->recv == l2cap_sock_recv_cb + * __sock_queue_rcv_skb + * Another thread calls: + * bt_sock_recvmsg + * skb_recv_datagram + * skb_free_datagram + * Then the current thread tries to access control, but + * it was freed by skb_free_datagram. + */ + local_control = *control; err = l2cap_reassemble_sdu(chan, skb, control); if (err) break; - if (control->final) { + if (local_control.final) { if (!test_and_clear_bit(CONN_REJ_ACT, &chan->conn_state)) { - control->final = 0; - l2cap_retransmit_all(chan, control); + local_control.final = 0; + l2cap_retransmit_all(chan, &local_control); l2cap_ertm_send(chan); } } @@ -6623,11 +6641,27 @@ static int l2cap_rx(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct l2cap_ctrl *control, static int l2cap_stream_rx(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct l2cap_ctrl *control, struct sk_buff *skb) { + /* l2cap_reassemble_sdu may free skb, hence invalidate control, so store + * the txseq field in advance to use it after l2cap_reassemble_sdu + * returns and to avoid the race condition, for example: + * + * The current thread calls: + * l2cap_reassemble_sdu + * chan->ops->recv == l2cap_sock_recv_cb + * __sock_queue_rcv_skb + * Another thread calls: + * bt_sock_recvmsg + * skb_recv_datagram + * skb_free_datagram + * Then the current thread tries to access control, but it was freed by + * skb_free_datagram. + */ + u16 txseq = control->txseq; + BT_DBG("chan %p, control %p, skb %p, state %d", chan, control, skb, chan->rx_state); - if (l2cap_classify_txseq(chan, control->txseq) == - L2CAP_TXSEQ_EXPECTED) { + if (l2cap_classify_txseq(chan, txseq) == L2CAP_TXSEQ_EXPECTED) { l2cap_pass_to_tx(chan, control); BT_DBG("buffer_seq %d->%d", chan->buffer_seq, @@ -6650,8 +6684,8 @@ static int l2cap_stream_rx(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct l2cap_ctrl *control, } } - chan->last_acked_seq = control->txseq; - chan->expected_tx_seq = __next_seq(chan, control->txseq); + chan->last_acked_seq = txseq; + chan->expected_tx_seq = __next_seq(chan, txseq); return 0; } -- Gitee From 5c4ff5c3feef2503d1c29b7a8ff0f97dafc9883f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 10:19:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/19] ovl: prevent private clone if bind mount is not allowed stable inclusion from stable-v4.19 commit 963d85d630dabe75a3cfde44a006fec3304d07b8 category: bugfix issue:#I6714F CVE: CVE-2021-3732 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 427215d85e8d1476da1a86b8d67aceb485eb3631 upstream. Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as well: - verify that the mount is in the current namespace - verify that there are no locked children Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager Fixes: c771d683a62e ("vfs: introduce clone_private_mount()") Cc: # v3.18 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- fs/namespace.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 741f40cd955e..edd397fa2991 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1799,6 +1799,20 @@ void drop_collected_mounts(struct vfsmount *mnt) namespace_unlock(); } +static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct mount *child; + + list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { + if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry)) + continue; + + if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) + return true; + } + return false; +} + /** * clone_private_mount - create a private clone of a path * @@ -1813,14 +1827,27 @@ struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(const struct path *path) struct mount *old_mnt = real_mount(path->mnt); struct mount *new_mnt; + down_read(&namespace_sem); if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old_mnt)) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto invalid; + + if (!check_mnt(old_mnt)) + goto invalid; + + if (has_locked_children(old_mnt, path->dentry)) + goto invalid; new_mnt = clone_mnt(old_mnt, path->dentry, CL_PRIVATE); + up_read(&namespace_sem); + if (IS_ERR(new_mnt)) return ERR_CAST(new_mnt); return &new_mnt->mnt; + +invalid: + up_read(&namespace_sem); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clone_private_mount); @@ -2136,19 +2163,6 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags) return err; } -static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - struct mount *child; - list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { - if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry)) - continue; - - if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) - return true; - } - return false; -} - /* * do loopback mount. */ -- Gitee From 668c4b64c0ce22b31d02dc51ed009129db0e7761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 15:05:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/19] sctp: handle the init chunk matching an existing asoc mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 1c16a1862595e66d22d34799a9f328defc884369 category: bugfix issue:#I6714K CVE: NA Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- This is from Section 4 of draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-udp-encaps-cons-03, and it requires responding with an abort chunk with an error cause when the udp source port of the received init chunk doesn't match the encap port of the transport. Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: gaochao --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index b9f7250b5c45..3705d2fdc518 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -102,6 +102,13 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8( const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); +static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_new_encap_port( + struct net *net, + const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, + void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); static struct sctp_sackhdr *sctp_sm_pull_sack(struct sctp_chunk *chunk); static enum sctp_disposition sctp_stop_t1_and_abort( @@ -1508,6 +1515,10 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (SCTP_INPUT_CB(chunk->skb)->encap_port != chunk->transport->encap_port) + return sctp_sf_new_encap_port(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Grab the INIT header. */ chunk->subh.init_hdr = (struct sctp_inithdr *)chunk->skb->data; @@ -3407,6 +3418,45 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8( sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, abort); + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT, SCTP_PACKET(packet)); + + SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS); + + sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME; +} + +/* Handling of SCTP Packets Containing an INIT Chunk Matching an + * Existing Associations when the UDP encap port is incorrect. + * + * From Section 4 at draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-udp-encaps-cons-03. + */ +static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_new_encap_port( + struct net *net, + const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, + void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +{ + struct sctp_packet *packet = NULL; + struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + struct sctp_chunk *abort; + + packet = sctp_ootb_pkt_new(net, asoc, chunk); + if (!packet) + return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM; + + abort = sctp_make_new_encap_port(asoc, chunk); + if (!abort) { + sctp_ootb_pkt_free(packet); + return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM; + } + + abort->skb->sk = ep->base.sk; + + sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, abort); + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT, SCTP_PACKET(packet)); -- Gitee From 698cfbeb1bb3decda3675dd15acc30b5f53e4987 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 22:02:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/19] sctp: check asoc peer.asconf_capable before processing asconf mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit a2eeacc830438d738d21230325662fe5c22c3bf0 category: bugfix issue:#I6714K CVE: NA Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- asconf chunks should be dropped when the asoc doesn't support asconf feature. Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: gaochao --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 3705d2fdc518..8a4d18aa1c4f 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3800,7 +3800,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, * is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. */ - if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth) + if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || + (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)) return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -3942,7 +3943,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, * is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. */ - if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth) + if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || + (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)) return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); -- Gitee From 5e9610b99a2b3a313c77e992b28cbb14bd01f78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Fri, 22 Oct 2021 12:36:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 06/19] Merge branch 'sctp-enhancements-for-the-verification-tag' mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 32f8807a48ae55be0e76880cfe8607a18b5bb0df category: bugfix issue:#I6714K CVE: CVE-2021-3772 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- Xin Long says: ==================== sctp: enhancements for the verification tag This patchset is to address CVE-2021-3772: A flaw was found in the Linux SCTP stack. A blind attacker may be able to kill an existing SCTP association through invalid chunks if the attacker knows the IP-addresses and port numbers being used and the attacker can send packets with spoofed IP addresses. This is caused by the missing VTAG verification for the received chunks and the incorrect vtag for the ABORT used to reply to these invalid chunks. This patchset is to go over all processing functions for the received chunks and do: 1. Make sure sctp_vtag_verify() is called firstly to verify the vtag from the received chunk and discard this chunk if it fails. With some exceptions: a. sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init()/5_2_2_dupinit()/9_2_reshutack(), processing INIT chunk, as sctphdr vtag is always 0 in INIT chunk. b. sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(), processing dupicate COOKIE_ECHO chunk, as the vtag verification will be done by sctp_tietags_compare() and then it takes right actions according to the return. c. sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(), processing SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk for cookie_wait and cookie_echoed state, as RFC demand sending a SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE even if the vtag verification failed. d. sctp_sf_ootb(), called in many types of chunks for closed state or no asoc, as the same reason to c. 2. Always use the vtag from the received INIT chunk to make the response ABORT in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(). 3. Fix the order for some checks and add some missing checks for the received chunk. This patch series has been tested with SCTP TAHI testing to make sure no regression caused on protocol conformance. ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1634730082.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: gaochao --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 8a4d18aa1c4f..cfd3c9245a06 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -171,6 +171,12 @@ static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( void *arg, struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); +static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); + /* Small helper function that checks if the chunk length * is of the appropriate length. The 'required_length' argument * is set to be the size of a specific chunk we are testing. @@ -352,6 +358,14 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. + * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation + * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll + * just discard the packet. + */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -366,14 +380,6 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation - * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll - * just discard the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back * and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close(). @@ -719,6 +725,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, struct sock *sk; int error = 0; + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -733,7 +742,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, * in sctp_unpack_cookie(). */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); /* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations * on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an @@ -1502,20 +1512,16 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification * Tag. */ if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * In this case, we generate a protocol violation since we have - * an association established. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - if (SCTP_INPUT_CB(chunk->skb)->encap_port != chunk->transport->encap_port) return sctp_sf_new_encap_port(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -1836,9 +1842,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a( * its peer. */ if (sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT)) { - disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, - SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), - chunk, commands); + disposition = __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, + SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), + chunk, commands); if (SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM == disposition) goto nomem; @@ -2151,9 +2157,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook( * enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is * done later. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) { + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + } /* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we * are in good shape. @@ -2290,7 +2298,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2336,7 +2344,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2606,7 +2614,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2919,13 +2927,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_shut_ctsn( * that belong to this association, it should discard the INIT chunk and * retransmit the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk. */ -enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( - struct net *net, - const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, - const struct sctp_association *asoc, - const union sctp_subtype type, - void *arg, - struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; struct sctp_chunk *reply; @@ -2959,6 +2965,26 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM; } +enum sctp_disposition +sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +{ + struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + + if (!chunk->singleton) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) + return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + return __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); +} + /* * sctp_sf_do_ecn_cwr * @@ -3611,6 +3637,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES); + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_hdr; do { /* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */ @@ -3726,12 +3755,6 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5( SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS); - /* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process - * the reset of the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent * potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks. * This is documented in SCTP Threats ID. @@ -3759,6 +3782,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, @@ -3794,6 +3820,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); } + /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1 * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3802,13 +3833,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, */ if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)chunk->skb->data; serial = ntohl(hdr->serial); @@ -3937,6 +3962,12 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); } + /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, + sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2: * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3945,14 +3976,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, */ if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, - sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); addip_hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)asconf_ack->skb->data; rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial); @@ -4524,6 +4548,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_discard_chunk(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison. @@ -4591,6 +4618,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, @@ -6297,6 +6327,7 @@ static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new( * yet. */ switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) { + case SCTP_CID_INIT: case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK: { struct sctp_initack_chunk *initack; -- Gitee From c00f663fa38dcdc6ad97d54008ff2dd1fb72751b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:00:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 07/19] ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent hw_params and hw_free calls mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 9cb6c40a6ebe4a0cfc9d6a181958211682cffea9 category: bugfix issue:#I67166 CVE: CVE-2022-1048 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 92ee3c60ec9fe64404dc035e7c41277d74aa26cb upstream. Currently we have neither proper check nor protection against the concurrent calls of PCM hw_params and hw_free ioctls, which may result in a UAF. Since the existing PCM stream lock can't be used for protecting the whole ioctl operations, we need a new mutex to protect those racy calls. This patch introduced a new mutex, runtime->buffer_mutex, and applies it to both hw_params and hw_free ioctl code paths. Along with it, the both functions are slightly modified (the mmap_count check is moved into the state-check block) for code simplicity. Reported-by: Hu Jiahui Cc: Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322170720.3529-2-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai [OP: backport to 4.19: adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- include/sound/pcm.h | 1 + sound/core/pcm.c | 2 ++ sound/core/pcm_native.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/sound/pcm.h b/include/sound/pcm.h index d6bd3caf6878..0871e16cd04b 100644 --- a/include/sound/pcm.h +++ b/include/sound/pcm.h @@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ struct snd_pcm_runtime { wait_queue_head_t sleep; /* poll sleep */ wait_queue_head_t tsleep; /* transfer sleep */ struct fasync_struct *fasync; + struct mutex buffer_mutex; /* protect for buffer changes */ /* -- private section -- */ void *private_data; diff --git a/sound/core/pcm.c b/sound/core/pcm.c index 01b9d62eef14..0b618a4b5c37 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm.c @@ -1027,6 +1027,7 @@ int snd_pcm_attach_substream(struct snd_pcm *pcm, int stream, init_waitqueue_head(&runtime->tsleep); runtime->status->state = SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN; + mutex_init(&runtime->buffer_mutex); substream->runtime = runtime; substream->private_data = pcm->private_data; @@ -1058,6 +1059,7 @@ void snd_pcm_detach_substream(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) substream->runtime = NULL; if (substream->timer) spin_unlock_irq(&substream->timer->lock); + mutex_destroy(&runtime->buffer_mutex); kfree(runtime); put_pid(substream->pid); substream->pid = NULL; diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c index 7c12b0deb4eb..846521852596 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c @@ -666,33 +666,40 @@ static int snd_pcm_hw_params_choose(struct snd_pcm_substream *pcm, return 0; } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS) +#define is_oss_stream(substream) ((substream)->oss.oss) +#else +#define is_oss_stream(substream) false +#endif + static int snd_pcm_hw_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params) { struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; - int err, usecs; + int err = 0, usecs; unsigned int bits; snd_pcm_uframes_t frames; if (PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream)) return -ENXIO; runtime = substream->runtime; + mutex_lock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream); switch (runtime->status->state) { case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN: case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP: case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED: + if (!is_oss_stream(substream) && + atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) + err = -EBADFD; break; default: - snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); - return -EBADFD; + err = -EBADFD; + break; } snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS) - if (!substream->oss.oss) -#endif - if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) - return -EBADFD; + if (err) + goto unlock; params->rmask = ~0U; err = snd_pcm_hw_refine(substream, params); @@ -764,14 +771,19 @@ static int snd_pcm_hw_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, if ((usecs = period_to_usecs(runtime)) >= 0) pm_qos_add_request(&substream->latency_pm_qos_req, PM_QOS_CPU_DMA_LATENCY, usecs); - return 0; + err = 0; _error: - /* hardware might be unusable from this time, - so we force application to retry to set - the correct hardware parameter settings */ - snd_pcm_set_state(substream, SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN); - if (substream->ops->hw_free != NULL) - substream->ops->hw_free(substream); + if (err) { + /* hardware might be unusable from this time, + * so we force application to retry to set + * the correct hardware parameter settings + */ + snd_pcm_set_state(substream, SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN); + if (substream->ops->hw_free != NULL) + substream->ops->hw_free(substream); + } + unlock: + mutex_unlock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); return err; } @@ -804,22 +816,27 @@ static int snd_pcm_hw_free(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) if (PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream)) return -ENXIO; runtime = substream->runtime; + mutex_lock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream); switch (runtime->status->state) { case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP: case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED: + if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) + result = -EBADFD; break; default: - snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); - return -EBADFD; + result = -EBADFD; + break; } snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); - if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) - return -EBADFD; + if (result) + goto unlock; if (substream->ops->hw_free) result = substream->ops->hw_free(substream); snd_pcm_set_state(substream, SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN); pm_qos_remove_request(&substream->latency_pm_qos_req); + unlock: + mutex_unlock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); return result; } -- Gitee From 423022899ba8816da35ffc9743e16dbc27df35f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:00:15 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 08/19] ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent read/write and buffer changes mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit b3830197aa7413c65767cf5a1aa8775c83f0dbf7 category: bugfix issue:#I67166 CVE: CVE-2022-1048 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit dca947d4d26dbf925a64a6cfb2ddbc035e831a3d upstream. In the current PCM design, the read/write syscalls (as well as the equivalent ioctls) are allowed before the PCM stream is running, that is, at PCM PREPARED state. Meanwhile, we also allow to re-issue hw_params and hw_free ioctl calls at the PREPARED state that may change or free the buffers, too. The problem is that there is no protection against those mix-ups. This patch applies the previously introduced runtime->buffer_mutex to the read/write operations so that the concurrent hw_params or hw_free call can no longer interfere during the operation. The mutex is unlocked before scheduling, so we don't take it too long. Cc: Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322170720.3529-3-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- sound/core/pcm_lib.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c index 56295936387c..5f36cafb12bd 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c @@ -1876,9 +1876,11 @@ static int wait_for_avail(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, if (avail >= runtime->twake) break; snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); + mutex_unlock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); tout = schedule_timeout(wait_time); + mutex_lock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream); set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); switch (runtime->status->state) { @@ -2172,6 +2174,7 @@ snd_pcm_sframes_t __snd_pcm_lib_xfer(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, nonblock = !!(substream->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); + mutex_lock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream); err = pcm_accessible_state(runtime); if (err < 0) @@ -2254,6 +2257,7 @@ snd_pcm_sframes_t __snd_pcm_lib_xfer(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, if (xfer > 0 && err >= 0) snd_pcm_update_state(substream, runtime); snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream); + mutex_unlock(&runtime->buffer_mutex); return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__snd_pcm_lib_xfer); -- Gitee From 5b82a901c36eabe6985dae400be94bcf7251d385 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:00:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 09/19] ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent prepare and hw_params/hw_free calls mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 47cef5937a43a412405ea54ad6e0a91d2890493e category: bugfix issue:#I67166 CVE: CVE-2022-1048 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 3c3201f8c7bb77eb53b08a3ca8d9a4ddc500b4c0 upstream. Like the previous fixes to hw_params and hw_free ioctl races, we need to paper over the concurrent prepare ioctl calls against hw_params and hw_free, too. This patch implements the locking with the existing runtime->buffer_mutex for prepare ioctls. Unlike the previous case for snd_pcm_hw_hw_params() and snd_pcm_hw_free(), snd_pcm_prepare() is performed to the linked streams, hence the lock can't be applied simply on the top. For tracking the lock in each linked substream, we modify snd_pcm_action_group() slightly and apply the buffer_mutex for the case stream_lock=false (formerly there was no lock applied) there. Cc: Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322170720.3529-4-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai [OP: backport to 4.19: adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- sound/core/pcm_native.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c index 846521852596..fa4fbdb04297 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c @@ -1073,15 +1073,17 @@ struct action_ops { */ static int snd_pcm_action_group(const struct action_ops *ops, struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, - int state, int do_lock) + int state, int stream_lock) { struct snd_pcm_substream *s = NULL; struct snd_pcm_substream *s1; int res = 0, depth = 1; snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s, substream) { - if (do_lock && s != substream) { - if (s->pcm->nonatomic) + if (s != substream) { + if (!stream_lock) + mutex_lock_nested(&s->runtime->buffer_mutex, depth); + else if (s->pcm->nonatomic) mutex_lock_nested(&s->self_group.mutex, depth); else spin_lock_nested(&s->self_group.lock, depth); @@ -1109,18 +1111,18 @@ static int snd_pcm_action_group(const struct action_ops *ops, ops->post_action(s, state); } _unlock: - if (do_lock) { - /* unlock streams */ - snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s1, substream) { - if (s1 != substream) { - if (s1->pcm->nonatomic) - mutex_unlock(&s1->self_group.mutex); - else - spin_unlock(&s1->self_group.lock); - } - if (s1 == s) /* end */ - break; + /* unlock streams */ + snd_pcm_group_for_each_entry(s1, substream) { + if (s1 != substream) { + if (!stream_lock) + mutex_unlock(&s1->runtime->buffer_mutex); + else if (s1->pcm->nonatomic) + mutex_unlock(&s1->self_group.mutex); + else + spin_unlock(&s1->self_group.lock); } + if (s1 == s) /* end */ + break; } return res; } @@ -1201,10 +1203,12 @@ static int snd_pcm_action_nonatomic(const struct action_ops *ops, int res; down_read(&snd_pcm_link_rwsem); + mutex_lock(&substream->runtime->buffer_mutex); if (snd_pcm_stream_linked(substream)) res = snd_pcm_action_group(ops, substream, state, 0); else res = snd_pcm_action_single(ops, substream, state); + mutex_unlock(&substream->runtime->buffer_mutex); up_read(&snd_pcm_link_rwsem); return res; } -- Gitee From fd0e7a55b91b63e4395354df37845d3a0dac7e05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:00:17 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 10/19] ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent prealloc proc writes mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit e14dca613e0a6ddc2bf6e360f16936a9f865205b category: bugfix issue:#I67166 CVE: CVE-2022-1048 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 69534c48ba8ce552ce383b3dfdb271ffe51820c3 upstream. We have no protection against concurrent PCM buffer preallocation changes via proc files, and it may potentially lead to UAF or some weird problem. This patch applies the PCM open_mutex to the proc write operation for avoiding the racy proc writes and the PCM stream open (and further operations). Cc: Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322170720.3529-5-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai [OP: backport to 4.19: adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- sound/core/pcm_memory.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_memory.c b/sound/core/pcm_memory.c index 4b5356a10315..48e5f0091ce4 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm_memory.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_memory.c @@ -160,19 +160,20 @@ static void snd_pcm_lib_preallocate_proc_write(struct snd_info_entry *entry, size_t size; struct snd_dma_buffer new_dmab; + mutex_lock(&substream->pcm->open_mutex); if (substream->runtime) { buffer->error = -EBUSY; - return; + goto unlock; } if (!snd_info_get_line(buffer, line, sizeof(line))) { snd_info_get_str(str, line, sizeof(str)); size = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 10) * 1024; if ((size != 0 && size < 8192) || size > substream->dma_max) { buffer->error = -EINVAL; - return; + goto unlock; } if (substream->dma_buffer.bytes == size) - return; + goto unlock; memset(&new_dmab, 0, sizeof(new_dmab)); new_dmab.dev = substream->dma_buffer.dev; if (size > 0) { @@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ static void snd_pcm_lib_preallocate_proc_write(struct snd_info_entry *entry, substream->dma_buffer.dev.dev, size, &new_dmab) < 0) { buffer->error = -ENOMEM; - return; + goto unlock; } substream->buffer_bytes_max = size; } else { @@ -192,6 +193,8 @@ static void snd_pcm_lib_preallocate_proc_write(struct snd_info_entry *entry, } else { buffer->error = -EINVAL; } + unlock: + mutex_unlock(&substream->pcm->open_mutex); } static inline void preallocate_info_init(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) -- Gitee From de966e8c011acdf113496edfd6af9ffc731d9f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haimin Zhang Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:20:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/19] af_key: add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 693fe8af9a2625139de07bd1ae212a7d89c37795 category: bugfix issue:#I6716B CVE: CVE-2022-1353 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9a564bccb78a76740ea9d75a259942df8143d02c ] Add __GFP_ZERO flag for compose_sadb_supported in function pfkey_register to initialize the buffer of supp_skb to fix a kernel-info-leak issue. 1) Function pfkey_register calls compose_sadb_supported to request a sk_buff. 2) compose_sadb_supported calls alloc_sbk to allocate a sk_buff, but it doesn't zero it. 3) If auth_len is greater 0, then compose_sadb_supported treats the memory as a struct sadb_supported and begins to initialize. But it just initializes the field sadb_supported_len and field sadb_supported_exttype without field sadb_supported_reserved. Reported-by: TCS Robot Signed-off-by: Haimin Zhang Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: gaochao --- net/key/af_key.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index cd3ba8a60451..a432848f5bda 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ static int pfkey_register(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sad mutex_lock(&pfkey_mutex); xfrm_probe_algs(); - supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL); + supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); mutex_unlock(&pfkey_mutex); if (!supp_skb) { if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC) -- Gitee From 8a0f8cdc21836895f6800e1b319cd8c4a000b89d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 18:37:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 12/19] hamradio: defer 6pack kfree after unregister_netdev mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 9d2a1b180f0d5fdf0844cb4c740fafd67bebb9d2 category: bugfix issue:#I6716F CVE: CVE-2022-1195 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 0b9111922b1f399aba6ed1e1b8f2079c3da1aed8 upstream. There is a possible race condition (use-after-free) like below (USE) | (FREE) dev_queue_xmit | __dev_queue_xmit | __dev_xmit_skb | sch_direct_xmit | ... xmit_one | netdev_start_xmit | tty_ldisc_kill __netdev_start_xmit | 6pack_close sp_xmit | kfree sp_encaps | | According to the patch "defer ax25 kfree after unregister_netdev", this patch reorder the kfree after the unregister_netdev to avoid the possible UAF as the unregister_netdev() is well synchronized and won't return if there is a running routine. Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c index 68636b6b2c7a..0ef2dfd59d73 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c @@ -679,9 +679,11 @@ static void sixpack_close(struct tty_struct *tty) del_timer_sync(&sp->tx_t); del_timer_sync(&sp->resync_t); - /* Free all 6pack frame buffers. */ + /* Free all 6pack frame buffers after unreg. */ kfree(sp->rbuff); kfree(sp->xbuff); + + free_netdev(sp->dev); } /* Perform I/O control on an active 6pack channel. */ -- Gitee From 9ebfaf7de0a6b34d382bcbcb2360d8d8a1c0448b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 22:09:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 13/19] net: hamradio: fix memory leak in mkiss_close mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 7edcc682301492380fbdd604b4516af5ae667a13 category: bugfix issue:#I6716F CVE: NA Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- My local syzbot instance hit memory leak in mkiss_open()[1]. The problem was in missing free_netdev() in mkiss_close(). In mkiss_open() netdevice is allocated and then registered, but in mkiss_close() netdevice was only unregistered, but not freed. Fail log: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8880281ba000 (size 4096): comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 61 78 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ax0............. 00 27 fa 2a 80 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .'.*............ backtrace: [] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0 [] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0xe80 [] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1] [] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110 [] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670 [] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440 [] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 [] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8880141a9a00 (size 96): comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): e8 a2 1b 28 80 88 ff ff e8 a2 1b 28 80 88 ff ff ...(.......(.... 98 92 9c aa b0 40 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....@.......... backtrace: [] __hw_addr_create_ex+0x5b/0x310 [] __hw_addr_add_ex+0x1f8/0x2b0 [] dev_addr_init+0x10b/0x1f0 [] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x13b/0xe80 [] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1] [] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110 [] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670 [] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440 [] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 [] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8880219bfc00 (size 512): comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 a0 1b 28 80 88 ff ff 80 8f b1 8d ff ff ff ff ...(............ 80 8f b1 8d ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0 [] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x777/0xe80 [] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1] [] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110 [] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670 [] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440 [] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 [] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888029b2b200 (size 256): comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0 [] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x912/0xe80 [] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1] [] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110 [] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670 [] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440 [] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 [] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fixes: 815f62bf7427 ("[PATCH] SMP rewrite of mkiss") Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c index 3b14e6e281d4..940aa7a19f50 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c @@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ static void mkiss_close(struct tty_struct *tty) ax->tty = NULL; unregister_netdev(ax->dev); + free_netdev(ax->dev); } /* Perform I/O control on an active ax25 channel. */ -- Gitee From a0faf47aeb50fc2bb1b22dacb244e0560e038a6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 18:37:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 14/19] hamradio: defer ax25 kfree after unregister_netdev mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 896193a02a2981e60c40d4614fd095ce92135ccd category: bugfix issue:#I6716F CVE: CVE-2022-1195 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 3e0588c291d6ce225f2b891753ca41d45ba42469 upstream. There is a possible race condition (use-after-free) like below (USE) | (FREE) ax25_sendmsg | ax25_queue_xmit | dev_queue_xmit | __dev_queue_xmit | __dev_xmit_skb | sch_direct_xmit | ... xmit_one | netdev_start_xmit | tty_ldisc_kill __netdev_start_xmit | mkiss_close ax_xmit | kfree ax_encaps | | Even though there are two synchronization primitives before the kfree: 1. wait_for_completion(&ax->dead). This can prevent the race with routines from mkiss_ioctl. However, it cannot stop the routine coming from upper layer, i.e., the ax25_sendmsg. 2. netif_stop_queue(ax->dev). It seems that this line of code aims to halt the transmit queue but it fails to stop the routine that already being xmit. This patch reorder the kfree after the unregister_netdev to avoid the possible UAF as the unregister_netdev() is well synchronized and won't return if there is a running routine. Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c index 940aa7a19f50..61cd464c1224 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c @@ -803,13 +803,14 @@ static void mkiss_close(struct tty_struct *tty) */ netif_stop_queue(ax->dev); - /* Free all AX25 frame buffers. */ - kfree(ax->rbuff); - kfree(ax->xbuff); - ax->tty = NULL; unregister_netdev(ax->dev); + + /* Free all AX25 frame buffers after unreg. */ + kfree(ax->rbuff); + kfree(ax->xbuff); + free_netdev(ax->dev); } -- Gitee From f687e2ebe47e0d6192be94c48e3f99f683846dec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 22:14:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 15/19] hamradio: remove needs_free_netdev to avoid UAF mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 3befa9b67f2205f10c3b01cc687672e3969be569 category: bugfix issue:#I6716F CVE: CVE-2022-1195 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 81b1d548d00bcd028303c4f3150fa753b9b8aa71 upstream. The former patch "defer 6pack kfree after unregister_netdev" reorders the kfree of two buffer after the unregister_netdev to prevent the race condition. It also adds free_netdev() function in sixpack_close(), which is a direct copy from the similar code in mkiss_close(). However, in sixpack driver, the flag needs_free_netdev is set to true in sp_setup(), hence the unregister_netdev() will free the netdev automatically. Therefore, as the sp is netdev_priv, use-after-free occurs. This patch removes the needs_free_netdev = true and just let the free_netdev to finish this deallocation task. Fixes: 0b9111922b1f ("hamradio: defer 6pack kfree after unregister_netdev") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111141402.7551-1-linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c index 0ef2dfd59d73..6f7e1598106f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c @@ -311,7 +311,6 @@ static void sp_setup(struct net_device *dev) { /* Finish setting up the DEVICE info. */ dev->netdev_ops = &sp_netdev_ops; - dev->needs_free_netdev = true; dev->mtu = SIXP_MTU; dev->hard_header_len = AX25_MAX_HEADER_LEN; dev->header_ops = &ax25_header_ops; -- Gitee From 052e69d49fddd616d4e290727baf904286389ef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 10:13:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 16/19] hamradio: improve the incomplete fix to avoid NPD mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit b68f41c6320b2b7fbb54a95f07a69f3dc7e56c59 category: bugfix issue:#I6716F CVE: CVE-2022-1195 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit b2f37aead1b82a770c48b5d583f35ec22aabb61e upstream. The previous commit 3e0588c291d6 ("hamradio: defer ax25 kfree after unregister_netdev") reorder the kfree operations and unregister_netdev operation to prevent UAF. This commit improves the previous one by also deferring the nullify of the ax->tty pointer. Otherwise, a NULL pointer dereference bug occurs. Partial of the stack trace is shown below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000538 RIP: 0010:ax_xmit+0x1f9/0x400 ... Call Trace: dev_hard_start_xmit+0xec/0x320 sch_direct_xmit+0xea/0x240 __qdisc_run+0x166/0x5c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2c7/0xaf0 ax25_std_establish_data_link+0x59/0x60 ax25_connect+0x3a0/0x500 ? security_socket_connect+0x2b/0x40 __sys_connect+0x96/0xc0 ? __hrtimer_init+0xc0/0xc0 ? common_nsleep+0x2e/0x50 ? switch_fpu_return+0x139/0x1a0 __x64_sys_connect+0x11/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The crash point is shown as below static void ax_encaps(...) { ... set_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &ax->tty->flags); // ax->tty = NULL! ... } By placing the nullify action after the unregister_netdev, the ax->tty pointer won't be assigned as NULL net_device framework layer is well synchronized. Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c index 61cd464c1224..ba0ca85e3d76 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c @@ -803,14 +803,14 @@ static void mkiss_close(struct tty_struct *tty) */ netif_stop_queue(ax->dev); - ax->tty = NULL; - unregister_netdev(ax->dev); /* Free all AX25 frame buffers after unreg. */ kfree(ax->rbuff); kfree(ax->xbuff); + ax->tty = NULL; + free_netdev(ax->dev); } -- Gitee From dc328306adeb587d8564a1a69a0cc3c722d9f4ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 17:43:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 17/19] power: supply: wm8350-power: Add missing free in free_charger_irq mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 60dd1082322966f192f42fe2a6605dfa08eef41f category: bugfix issue:#I6717K CVE: CVE-2022-3111 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6dee930f6f6776d1e5a7edf542c6863b47d9f078 ] In free_charger_irq(), there is no free for 'WM8350_IRQ_CHG_FAST_RDY'. Therefore, it should be better to add it in order to avoid the memory leak. Fixes: 14431aa0c5a4 ("power_supply: Add support for WM8350 PMU") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Acked-by: Charles Keepax Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/power/supply/wm8350_power.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/power/supply/wm8350_power.c b/drivers/power/supply/wm8350_power.c index 15c0ca15e2aa..034ddfe3b62c 100644 --- a/drivers/power/supply/wm8350_power.c +++ b/drivers/power/supply/wm8350_power.c @@ -459,6 +459,7 @@ static void free_charger_irq(struct wm8350 *wm8350) wm8350_free_irq(wm8350, WM8350_IRQ_CHG_TO, wm8350); wm8350_free_irq(wm8350, WM8350_IRQ_CHG_END, wm8350); wm8350_free_irq(wm8350, WM8350_IRQ_CHG_START, wm8350); + wm8350_free_irq(wm8350, WM8350_IRQ_CHG_FAST_RDY, wm8350); wm8350_free_irq(wm8350, WM8350_IRQ_CHG_VBATT_LT_3P9, wm8350); wm8350_free_irq(wm8350, WM8350_IRQ_CHG_VBATT_LT_3P1, wm8350); wm8350_free_irq(wm8350, WM8350_IRQ_CHG_VBATT_LT_2P85, wm8350); -- Gitee From 9cc51f7b62b374baccc2b455c135f005ea5394ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2020 20:12:34 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 18/19] drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c: add arithmetic overflow and array bounds checks mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit ae2e1aad3e48e495878d9f149e437a308bfdaefa category: bugfix issue:#I6718C CVE: NA Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- Adds LKDTM tests for arithmetic overflow (both signed and unsigned), as well as array bounds checking. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Dan Carpenter Cc: Elena Petrova Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200227193516.32566-4-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 3 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 3 ++ 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c index 7eebbdfbcacd..c723a3d7268d 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include struct lkdtm_list { struct list_head node; @@ -155,6 +156,80 @@ void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void) schedule(); } +volatile unsigned int huge = INT_MAX - 2; +volatile unsigned int ignored; + +void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_SIGNED(void) +{ + int value; + + value = huge; + pr_info("Normal signed addition ...\n"); + value += 1; + ignored = value; + + pr_info("Overflowing signed addition ...\n"); + value += 4; + ignored = value; +} + + +void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_UNSIGNED(void) +{ + unsigned int value; + + value = huge; + pr_info("Normal unsigned addition ...\n"); + value += 1; + ignored = value; + + pr_info("Overflowing unsigned addition ...\n"); + value += 4; + ignored = value; +} + +/* Intentially using old-style flex array definition of 1 byte. */ +struct array_bounds_flex_array { + int one; + int two; + char data[1]; +}; + +struct array_bounds { + int one; + int two; + char data[8]; + int three; +}; + +void lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS(void) +{ + struct array_bounds_flex_array *not_checked; + struct array_bounds *checked; + volatile int i; + + not_checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*not_checked) * 2, GFP_KERNEL); + checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*checked) * 2, GFP_KERNEL); + + pr_info("Array access within bounds ...\n"); + /* For both, touch all bytes in the actual member size. */ + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(checked->data); i++) + checked->data[i] = 'A'; + /* + * For the uninstrumented flex array member, also touch 1 byte + * beyond to verify it is correctly uninstrumented. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(not_checked->data) + 1; i++) + not_checked->data[i] = 'A'; + + pr_info("Array access beyond bounds ...\n"); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(checked->data) + 1; i++) + checked->data[i] = 'B'; + + kfree(not_checked); + kfree(checked); +} + void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void) { /* diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c index 07caaa2cfe1e..357755645488 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c @@ -146,6 +146,9 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = { CRASHTYPE(HARDLOCKUP), CRASHTYPE(SPINLOCKUP), CRASHTYPE(HUNG_TASK), + CRASHTYPE(OVERFLOW_SIGNED), + CRASHTYPE(OVERFLOW_UNSIGNED), + CRASHTYPE(ARRAY_BOUNDS), CRASHTYPE(EXEC_DATA), CRASHTYPE(EXEC_STACK), CRASHTYPE(EXEC_KMALLOC), diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h index 8c3f2e6af256..50172b18fb9c 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ void lkdtm_SOFTLOCKUP(void); void lkdtm_HARDLOCKUP(void); void lkdtm_SPINLOCKUP(void); void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void); +void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_SIGNED(void); +void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_UNSIGNED(void); +void lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS(void); void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void); void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void); void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void); -- Gitee From a0bcfbf2bd4ae9513880c803a5a85ec8940e79a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 17:29:36 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 19/19] lkdtm/bugs: Check for the NULL pointer after calling kmalloc mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 4a9800c81d2f34afb66b4b42e0330ae8298019a2 category: bugfix issue:#I6718C CVE: CVE-2022-3104 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- As the possible failure of the kmalloc(), the not_checked and checked could be NULL pointer. Therefore, it should be better to check it in order to avoid the dereference of the NULL pointer. Also, we need to kfree the 'not_checked' and 'checked' to avoid the memory leak if fails. And since it is just a test, it may directly return without error number. Fixes: ae2e1aad3e48 ("drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c: add arithmetic overflow and array bounds checks") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Acked-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220120092936.1874264-1-jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: gaochao --- drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c index c723a3d7268d..4376cc5953d4 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c @@ -210,6 +210,11 @@ void lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS(void) not_checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*not_checked) * 2, GFP_KERNEL); checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*checked) * 2, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!not_checked || !checked) { + kfree(not_checked); + kfree(checked); + return; + } pr_info("Array access within bounds ...\n"); /* For both, touch all bytes in the actual member size. */ -- Gitee