From c6e056e51616938ba95b44925705512d4cc30f3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=E7=8E=8B=E7=AD=96?= Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2024 14:42:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] update 2.10-5 --- 0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch | 52 +++ ...und-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch | 103 +++++ ...notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch | 106 +++++ ...sec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch | 192 +++++++++ ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 198 ++++++++++ wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch | 16 + wpa_supplicant-config.patch | 71 ++++ wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch | 35 ++ wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch | 36 ++ ...-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch | 106 +++++ ...x-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch | 93 +++++ ...iguration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch | 363 ++++++++++++++++++ ...upplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch | 30 ++ wpa_supplicant.spec | 31 +- 14 files changed, 1430 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch create mode 100644 0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch create mode 100644 0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-config.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch diff --git a/0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch b/0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6568dc --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 5b093570dca1855c5bf40bcbd8d149fa6f8ea8ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <5b093570dca1855c5bf40bcbd8d149fa6f8ea8ff.1650620058.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Lubomir Rintel +Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 09:54:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] D-Bus: Add 'wep_disabled' capability + +Since commit 200c7693c9a1 ('Make WEP functionality an optional build +parameter'), WEP support is optional and, indeed, off by default. + +The distributions are now catching up and disabling WEP in their builds. +Unfortunately, there's no indication prior to an attempt to connect to a +WEP network that it's not going to work. Add a capability to communicate +that. + +Unlike other capabilities, this one is negative. That is, it indicates +lack of a WEP support as opposed to its presence. This is necessary +because historically there has been no capability to indicate presence +of WEP support and therefore NetworkManager (and probably others) just +assumes it's there. + +Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel +Acked-by: Davide Caratti +--- + wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c +index 1c9ded09a..0b1002bf1 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c +@@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ dbus_bool_t wpas_dbus_getter_global_capabilities( + const struct wpa_dbus_property_desc *property_desc, + DBusMessageIter *iter, DBusError *error, void *user_data) + { +- const char *capabilities[13]; ++ const char *capabilities[14]; + size_t num_items = 0; + struct wpa_global *global = user_data; + struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s; +@@ -1177,6 +1177,9 @@ dbus_bool_t wpas_dbus_getter_global_capabilities( + #endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */ + if (ext_key_id_supported) + capabilities[num_items++] = "extended_key_id"; ++#ifndef CONFIG_WEP ++ capabilities[num_items++] = "wep_disabled"; ++#endif /* !CONFIG_WEP */ + + return wpas_dbus_simple_array_property_getter(iter, + DBUS_TYPE_STRING, +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch b/0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a2ffaf --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 566ce69a8d0e64093309cbde80235aa522fbf84e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: <566ce69a8d0e64093309cbde80235aa522fbf84e.1652450572.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 00:07:44 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP peer: Workaround for servers that do not support safe TLS + renegotiation + +The TLS protocol design for renegotiation was identified to have a +significant security flaw in 2009 and an extension to secure this design +was published in 2010 (RFC 5746). However, some old RADIUS +authentication servers without support for this are still used commonly. + +This is obviously not good from the security view point, but since there +are cases where the user of a network service has no realistic means for +getting the authentication server upgraded, TLS handshake may still need +to be allowed to be able to use the network. + +OpenSSL 3.0 disabled the client side workaround by default and this +resulted in issues connection to some networks with insecure +authentication servers. With OpenSSL 3.0, the client is now enforcing +security by refusing to authenticate with such servers. The pre-3.0 +behavior of ignoring this issue and leaving security to the server can +now be enabled with a new phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1. +This should be used only when having to connect to a network that has an +insecure authentication server that cannot be upgraded. + +The old (pre-2010) TLS renegotiation mechanism might open security +vulnerabilities if the authentication server were to allow TLS +renegotiation to be initiated. While this is unlikely to cause real +issues with EAP-TLS, there might be cases where use of PEAP or TTLS with +an authentication server that does not support RFC 5746 might result in +a security vulnerability. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/crypto/tls.h | 1 + + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 5 +++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 4 ++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 5 +++++ + 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls.h b/src/crypto/tls.h +index ccaac94c9..7ea32ee4a 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls.h ++++ b/src/crypto/tls.h +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct tls_config { + #define TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1 BIT(15) + #define TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2 BIT(16) + #define TLS_CONN_TEAP_ANON_DH BIT(17) ++#define TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION BIT(18) + + /** + * struct tls_connection_params - Parameters for TLS connection +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index 388c6b0f4..0d23f44ad 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -3081,6 +3081,11 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags, + SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); + #endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET */ + ++#ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT ++ if (flags & TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION) ++ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT); ++#endif /* SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT */ ++ + #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 + if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0) + SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1); +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +index 06c9b211e..6193b4bdb 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ static void eap_tls_params_flags(struct tls_connection_params *params, + params->flags |= TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH; + if (os_strstr(txt, "tls_suiteb_no_ecdh=0")) + params->flags &= ~TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH; ++ if (os_strstr(txt, "allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1")) ++ params->flags |= TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION; ++ if (os_strstr(txt, "allow_unsafe_renegotiation=0")) ++ params->flags &= ~TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +index a1dc769c9..b5304a77e 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1370,6 +1370,11 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # tls_suiteb=0 - do not apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS (default) + # tls_suiteb=1 - apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS; this is used in + # particular when using Suite B with RSA keys of >= 3K (3072) bits ++# allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1 - allow connection with a TLS server that does ++# not support safe renegotiation (RFC 5746); please note that this ++# workaround should be only when having to authenticate with an old ++# authentication server that cannot be updated to use secure TLS ++# implementation. + # + # Following certificate/private key fields are used in inner Phase2 + # authentication when using EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP. +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch b/0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06807ee --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +From a561d12d24c2c8bb0f825d4a3a55a5e47e845853 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-Id: +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 23:55:38 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP peer status notification for server not supporting RFC + 5746 + +Add a notification message to indicate reason for TLS handshake failure +due to the server not supporting safe renegotiation (RFC 5746). + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/ap/authsrv.c | 3 +++ + src/crypto/tls.h | 3 ++- + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + src/eap_peer/eap.c | 5 +++++ + 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/authsrv.c b/src/ap/authsrv.c +index 516c1da74..fd9c96fad 100644 +--- a/src/ap/authsrv.c ++++ b/src/ap/authsrv.c +@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@ static void authsrv_tls_event(void *ctx, enum tls_event ev, + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "authsrv: remote TLS alert: %s", + data->alert.description); + break; ++ case TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED: ++ /* Not applicable to TLS server */ ++ break; + } + } + #endif /* EAP_TLS_FUNCS */ +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls.h b/src/crypto/tls.h +index 7ea32ee4a..7a2ee32df 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls.h ++++ b/src/crypto/tls.h +@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ enum tls_event { + TLS_CERT_CHAIN_SUCCESS, + TLS_CERT_CHAIN_FAILURE, + TLS_PEER_CERTIFICATE, +- TLS_ALERT ++ TLS_ALERT, ++ TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED, + }; + + /* +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index 0d23f44ad..912471ba2 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -4443,6 +4443,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_eap_fast_key(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn, + static struct wpabuf * + openssl_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn, const struct wpabuf *in_data) + { ++ struct tls_context *context = conn->context; + int res; + struct wpabuf *out_data; + +@@ -4472,7 +4473,19 @@ openssl_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn, const struct wpabuf *in_data) + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: SSL_connect - want to " + "write"); + else { ++ unsigned long error = ERR_peek_last_error(); ++ + tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, "SSL_connect"); ++ ++ if (context->event_cb && ++ ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_SSL && ++ ERR_GET_REASON(error) == ++ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { ++ context->event_cb( ++ context->cb_ctx, ++ TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED, ++ NULL); ++ } + conn->failed++; + if (!conn->server && !conn->client_hello_generated) { + /* The server would not understand TLS Alert +@@ -4495,8 +4508,6 @@ openssl_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn, const struct wpabuf *in_data) + if ((conn->flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB) && !conn->server && + os_strncmp(SSL_get_cipher(conn->ssl), "DHE-", 4) == 0 && + conn->server_dh_prime_len < 3072) { +- struct tls_context *context = conn->context; +- + /* + * This should not be reached since earlier cert_cb should have + * terminated the handshake. Keep this check here for extra +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap.c +index 429b20d3a..729388f4f 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap.c +@@ -2172,6 +2172,11 @@ static void eap_peer_sm_tls_event(void *ctx, enum tls_event ev, + eap_notify_status(sm, "remote TLS alert", + data->alert.description); + break; ++ case TLS_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED: ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "TLS handshake failed due to the server not supporting safe renegotiation (RFC 5746); phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1 can be used to work around this"); ++ eap_notify_status(sm, "unsafe server renegotiation", "failure"); ++ break; + } + + os_free(hash_hex); +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch b/wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24956a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +From 46c635910a724ed14ee9ace549fed9790ed5980b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <46c635910a724ed14ee9ace549fed9790ed5980b.1706279119.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: leiwei +Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 18:22:19 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] MACsec: Support GCM-AES-256 cipher suite + +Allow macsec_csindex to be configured and select the cipher suite when +the participant acts as a key server. + +Signed-off-by: leiwei +--- + hostapd/config_file.c | 10 ++++++++++ + hostapd/hostapd.conf | 4 ++++ + src/ap/ap_config.h | 7 +++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c | 4 +++- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c | 8 ++++---- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 3 ++- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 7 +++++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 4 ++-- + 11 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h +@@ -849,6 +849,13 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config { + int mka_priority; + + /** ++ * macsec_csindex - Cipher suite index for MACsec ++ * ++ * Range: 0-1 (default: 0) ++ */ ++ int macsec_csindex; ++ ++ /** + * mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN + */ + #define MACSEC_CKN_MAX_LEN 32 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c +@@ -329,7 +329,9 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm_hapd(struct + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_protect, + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_window, + hapd->conf->macsec_port, +- hapd->conf->mka_priority, hapd->conf->iface, ++ hapd->conf->mka_priority, ++ hapd->conf->macsec_csindex, ++ hapd->conf->iface, + hapd->own_addr); + /* ieee802_1x_kay_init() frees kay_ctx on failure */ + if (!res) +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ + #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm + #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "CP" + +-static u64 default_cs_id = CS_ID_GCM_AES_128; ++static u64 cs_id[] = { CS_ID_GCM_AES_128, CS_ID_GCM_AES_256 }; + + /* The variable defined in clause 12 in IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 */ + enum connect_type { PENDING, UNAUTHENTICATED, AUTHENTICATED, SECURE }; +@@ -210,7 +210,6 @@ SM_STATE(CP, SECURED) + sm->replay_protect = sm->kay->macsec_replay_protect; + sm->validate_frames = sm->kay->macsec_validate; + +- /* NOTE: now no other than default cipher suite (AES-GCM-128) */ + sm->current_cipher_suite = sm->cipher_suite; + secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(sm->kay, sm->current_cipher_suite); + +@@ -473,8 +472,8 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + sm->orx = false; + sm->otx = false; + +- sm->current_cipher_suite = default_cs_id; +- sm->cipher_suite = default_cs_id; ++ sm->current_cipher_suite = cs_id[kay->macsec_csindex]; ++ sm->cipher_suite = cs_id[kay->macsec_csindex]; + sm->cipher_offset = CONFIDENTIALITY_OFFSET_0; + sm->confidentiality_offset = sm->cipher_offset; + sm->transmit_delay = MKA_LIFE_TIME; +@@ -491,6 +490,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + secy_cp_control_enable_port(sm->kay, sm->controlled_port_enabled); + secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(sm->kay, + sm->confidentiality_offset); ++ secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(sm->kay, sm->current_cipher_suite); + + SM_STEP_RUN(CP); + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c +@@ -221,8 +221,16 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_dump_dist_sak_body(struct + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "\tKey Number............: %d", + be_to_host32(body->kn)); +- /* TODO: Other than GCM-AES-128 case: MACsec Cipher Suite */ +- wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tAES Key Wrap of SAK...:", body->sak, 24); ++ if (body_len == 28) { ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tAES Key Wrap of SAK...:", ++ body->sak, 24); ++ } else if (body_len > CS_ID_LEN - sizeof(body->kn)) { ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tMACsec Cipher Suite...:", ++ body->sak, CS_ID_LEN); ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "\tAES Key Wrap of SAK...:", ++ body->sak + CS_ID_LEN, ++ body_len - CS_ID_LEN - sizeof(body->kn)); ++ } + } + + +@@ -3456,7 +3464,8 @@ static void kay_l2_receive(void *ctx, co + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) ++ u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, ++ const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) + { + struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay; + +@@ -3493,7 +3502,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_ka + kay->dist_time = 0; + + kay->pn_exhaustion = PENDING_PN_EXHAUSTION; +- kay->macsec_csindex = DEFAULT_CS_INDEX; ++ kay->macsec_csindex = macsec_csindex; + kay->mka_algindex = DEFAULT_MKA_ALG_INDEX; + kay->mka_version = MKA_VERSION_ID; + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h +@@ -240,7 +240,8 @@ u64 mka_sci_u64(struct ieee802_1x_mka_sc + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); ++ u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, ++ const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); + void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay); + + struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant * +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2612,6 +2612,7 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fiel + { INT(macsec_replay_window) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_port, 1, 65534) }, + { INT_RANGE(mka_priority, 0, 255) }, ++ { INT_RANGE(macsec_csindex, 0, 1) }, + { FUNC_KEY(mka_cak) }, + { FUNC_KEY(mka_ckn) }, + #endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */ +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FIL + INT(macsec_replay_window); + INT(macsec_port); + INT_DEF(mka_priority, DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER); ++ INT(macsec_csindex); + #endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */ + #ifdef CONFIG_HS20 + INT(update_identifier); +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h +@@ -912,6 +912,13 @@ struct wpa_ssid { + int mka_priority; + + /** ++ * macsec_csindex - Cipher suite index for MACsec ++ * ++ * Range: 0-1 (default: 0) ++ */ ++ int macsec_csindex; ++ ++ /** + * mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN + */ + #define MACSEC_CKN_MAX_LEN 32 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c +@@ -241,8 +241,8 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_s + + res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, ssid->macsec_replay_protect, + ssid->macsec_replay_window, ssid->macsec_port, +- ssid->mka_priority, wpa_s->ifname, +- wpa_s->own_addr); ++ ssid->mka_priority, ssid->macsec_csindex, ++ wpa_s->ifname, wpa_s->own_addr); + /* ieee802_1x_kay_init() frees kay_ctx on failure */ + if (res == NULL) + return -1; diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch b/wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf3d8ed --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +From 8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.1708356763.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements + +The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 +authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated +during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP +specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front +is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than +the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when +unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed +devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the +user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. + +Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 +authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session +resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been +configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed +authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more +strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability +issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS +session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. + +Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 +configuration parameter option: +'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS +tunnel) behavior for PEAP: + * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication + * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate + (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was + not used (default) + * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 +++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 ++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 ++++++ + 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { + * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + * 2 = require cryptobinding + * ++ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++ * not used (default) ++ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases ++ * + * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and + * uuid=Device_UUID + * +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { + u8 cmk[20]; + int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) + * is enabled. */ ++ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; + }; + + +@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); + } + ++ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); ++ } + #ifdef EAP_TNC + if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { + data->soh = 2; +@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_s + data->force_peap_version = -1; + data->peap_outer_success = 2; + data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; + + if (config && config->phase1) + eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); +@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobindin + } + + ++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, ++ struct eap_peap_data *data) ++{ ++ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || ++ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && ++ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && ++ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || ++ data->phase2_eap_started) && ++ !data->phase2_eap_success) ++ return false; ++ return true; ++} ++ ++ + /** + * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response + * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() +@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm + " - force failed Phase 2"); + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; + ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; ++ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); ++ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; ++ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; + } else { + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; + ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; +@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: + /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate + * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has + * been completed. */ +- if (data->phase2_eap_started && +- !data->phase2_eap_success) { ++ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " + "Success used to indicate success, " + "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " +@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process( + static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) + { + struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; ++ + return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && +- data->phase2_success; ++ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; + } + + +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(stru + + sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); + ++ if (!phase2) ++ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || ++ params->client_cert_blob || ++ params->private_key || ++ params->private_key_blob; ++ + return 0; + } + +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { + * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used + */ + int tls_v13; ++ ++ /** ++ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured ++ */ ++ bool client_cert_conf; + }; + + +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1330,6 +1330,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) + # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + # * 2 = require cryptobinding ++# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++# not used (default) ++# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin= or + # pbc=1. + # diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch b/wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3b3568 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +diff -up wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c.assoc-timeout wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c +--- wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c.assoc-timeout 2010-09-07 10:43:39.000000000 -0500 ++++ wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2010-12-07 18:57:45.163457000 -0600 +@@ -1262,10 +1262,10 @@ void wpa_supplicant_associate(struct wpa + + if (assoc_failed) { + /* give IBSS a bit more time */ +- timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 10 : 5; ++ timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 20 : 10; + } else if (wpa_s->conf->ap_scan == 1) { + /* give IBSS a bit more time */ +- timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 20 : 10; ++ timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 20 : 20; + } + wpa_supplicant_req_auth_timeout(wpa_s, timeout, 0); + } diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-config.patch b/wpa_supplicant-config.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04d7ab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-config.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 72ee1e934e98ea87e4de292958817e724114703e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lubomir Rintel +Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 09:46:00 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] defconfig: Fedora configuration + +--- + wpa_supplicant/defconfig | 16 +++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig +@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y + CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y + + # EAP-AKA (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA is used) +-#CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y ++CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y + + # EAP-AKA' (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA' is used). + # This requires CONFIG_EAP_AKA to be enabled, too. +@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ CONFIG_BACKEND=file + # Select which ciphers to use by default with OpenSSL if the user does not + # specify them. + #CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW" ++CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="PROFILE=SYSTEM:3DES" + + # If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are + # needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of +@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y + #CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EAP_METHODS=y + + # IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 (Fast BSS Transition) for station mode +-CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y ++#CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y + + # Add support for writing debug log to a file (/tmp/wpa_supplicant-log-#.txt) + CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y +@@ -469,7 +470,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y + # Should we attempt to use the getrandom(2) call that provides more reliable + # yet secure randomness source than /dev/random on Linux 3.17 and newer. + # Requires glibc 2.25 to build, falls back to /dev/random if unavailable. +-#CONFIG_GETRANDOM=y ++CONFIG_GETRANDOM=y + + # IEEE 802.11ac (Very High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode) + CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y +@@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y + #CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL=y + + # Mesh Networking (IEEE 802.11s) +-#CONFIG_MESH=y ++CONFIG_MESH=y + + # Background scanning modules + # These can be used to request wpa_supplicant to perform background scanning +@@ -601,7 +602,7 @@ CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y + + # Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) + # Experimental implementation of draft-harkins-owe-07.txt +-#CONFIG_OWE=y ++CONFIG_OWE=y + + # Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP) (also known as Wi-Fi Easy Connect) + CONFIG_DPP=y +@@ -633,3 +634,6 @@ CONFIG_DPP2=y + # design is still subject to change. As such, this should not yet be enabled in + # production use. + #CONFIG_PASN=y ++# ++CONFIG_SUITEB192=y ++ diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch b/wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2295bc --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +--- a/src/utils/wpa_debug.c ++++ b/src/utils/wpa_debug.c +@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ void wpa_debug_print_timestamp(void) + if (out_file) + fprintf(out_file, "%ld.%06u: ", (long) tv.sec, + (unsigned int) tv.usec); ++ fflush(out_file); + #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */ + if (!out_file && !wpa_debug_syslog) + printf("%ld.%06u: ", (long) tv.sec, (unsigned int) tv.usec); +@@ -230,6 +231,7 @@ void wpa_printf(int level, const char *f + va_start(ap, fmt); + vfprintf(out_file, fmt, ap); + fprintf(out_file, "\n"); ++ fflush(out_file); + va_end(ap); + } + #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */ +@@ -365,6 +367,7 @@ static void _wpa_hexdump(int level, cons + fprintf(out_file, " [REMOVED]"); + } + fprintf(out_file, "\n"); ++ fflush(out_file); + } + #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */ + if (!wpa_debug_syslog && !out_file) { +@@ -468,6 +471,8 @@ static void _wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level + } + } + file_done: ++ if (out_file) ++ fflush(out_file); + #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */ + if (!wpa_debug_syslog && !out_file) { + if (!show) { diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch b/wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7acca1e --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 9404f356e394604d1d3d6dbffc52abd54260e4d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lubomir Rintel +Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 08:56:35 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wpa_supplicant: allow overriding the names of the Qt4 tools + +This is useful for distributions that ship different versions of Qt in +different locations. +--- + wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 7 +++++-- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile +@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ export INCDIR ?= /usr/local/include + export BINDIR ?= /usr/local/sbin + PKG_CONFIG ?= pkg-config + ++QMAKE ?= qmake ++LRELEASE ?= lrelease ++ + CFLAGS += $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) + CFLAGS += -I$(abspath ../src) + CFLAGS += -I$(abspath ../src/utils) +@@ -2039,10 +2042,10 @@ wpa_gui: + @echo "wpa_gui has been removed - see wpa_gui-qt4 for replacement" + + wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile: +- qmake -o wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro ++ $(QMAKE) -o wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro + + wpa_gui-qt4/lang/wpa_gui_de.qm: wpa_gui-qt4/lang/wpa_gui_de.ts +- lrelease wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro ++ $(LRELEASE) wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro + + wpa_gui-qt4: wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile wpa_gui-qt4/lang/wpa_gui_de.qm + $(MAKE) -C wpa_gui-qt4 diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be32491 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +From 40c139664439b2576e1506fbca14a7b79425a9dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <40c139664439b2576e1506fbca14a7b79425a9dd.1706279171.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Emeel Hakim +Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 10:26:57 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] macsec_linux: Add support for MACsec hardware offload + +This uses libnl3 to communicate with the macsec module available on +Linux. A recent enough version of libnl is needed for the hardware +offload support. + +Signed-off-by: Emeel Hakim +--- + src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c +index b609bbf38..c79e8733a 100644 +--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c ++++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c +@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ + + #define UNUSED_SCI 0xffffffffffffffff + ++#if LIBNL_VER_NUM >= LIBNL_VER(3, 6) ++#define LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++#endif ++ + struct cb_arg { + struct macsec_drv_data *drv; + u32 *pn; +@@ -73,6 +77,11 @@ struct macsec_drv_data { + bool replay_protect; + bool replay_protect_set; + ++#ifdef LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++ enum macsec_offload offload; ++ bool offload_set; ++#endif /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++ + u32 replay_window; + + u8 encoding_sa; +@@ -228,6 +237,15 @@ static int try_commit(struct macsec_drv_data *drv) + drv->replay_window); + } + ++#ifdef LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++ if (drv->offload_set) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, DRV_PREFIX ++ "%s: try_commit offload=%d", ++ drv->ifname, drv->offload); ++ rtnl_link_macsec_set_offload(drv->link, drv->offload); ++ } ++#endif /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++ + if (drv->encoding_sa_set) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, DRV_PREFIX + "%s: try_commit encoding_sa=%d", +@@ -455,6 +473,36 @@ static int macsec_drv_set_replay_protect(void *priv, bool enabled, + } + + ++/** ++ * macsec_drv_set_offload - Set offload status ++ * @priv: Private driver interface data ++ * @offload: 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported) ++ */ ++static int macsec_drv_set_offload(void *priv, u8 offload) ++{ ++#ifdef LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD ++ struct macsec_drv_data *drv = priv; ++ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s -> %02" PRIx8, __func__, offload); ++ ++ drv->offload_set = true; ++ drv->offload = offload; ++ ++ return try_commit(drv); ++#else /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++ if (offload == 0) ++ return 0; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "%s: libnl version does not include support for MACsec offload", ++ __func__); ++ return -1; ++#endif /* LIBNL_HAS_OFFLOAD */ ++} ++ ++ + /** + * macsec_drv_set_current_cipher_suite - Set current cipher suite + * @priv: Private driver interface data +@@ -1648,6 +1696,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_macsec_linux_ops = { + .enable_protect_frames = macsec_drv_enable_protect_frames, + .enable_encrypt = macsec_drv_enable_encrypt, + .set_replay_protect = macsec_drv_set_replay_protect, ++ .set_offload = macsec_drv_set_offload, + .set_current_cipher_suite = macsec_drv_set_current_cipher_suite, + .enable_controlled_port = macsec_drv_enable_controlled_port, + .get_receive_lowest_pn = macsec_drv_get_receive_lowest_pn, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eef0aa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 7e941e7a1560699a18c5890cb6e1309161bc01af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <7e941e7a1560699a18c5890cb6e1309161bc01af.1706279136.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: leiwei +Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 18:43:33 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] macsec_linux: Support cipher suite configuration + +Set the cipher suite for the link. Unlike the other parameters, this +needs to be done with the first rtnl_link_add() call (NLM_F_CREATE)) +instead of the update in try_commit() since the kernel is rejecting +changes to the cipher suite after the link is first added. + +Signed-off-by: leiwei +--- + src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c ++++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c +@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ struct macsec_drv_data { + + u8 encoding_sa; + bool encoding_sa_set; ++ ++ u64 cipher_suite; ++ bool cipher_suite_set; + }; + + +@@ -460,8 +463,14 @@ static int macsec_drv_set_replay_protect + */ + static int macsec_drv_set_current_cipher_suite(void *priv, u64 cs) + { ++ struct macsec_drv_data *drv = priv; ++ + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s -> %016" PRIx64, __func__, cs); +- return 0; ++ ++ drv->cipher_suite_set = true; ++ drv->cipher_suite = cs; ++ ++ return try_commit(drv); + } + + +@@ -1063,7 +1072,8 @@ static int macsec_drv_disable_receive_sa + } + + +-static struct rtnl_link * lookup_sc(struct nl_cache *cache, int parent, u64 sci) ++static struct rtnl_link * lookup_sc(struct nl_cache *cache, int parent, u64 sci, ++ u64 cs) + { + struct rtnl_link *needle; + void *match; +@@ -1074,6 +1084,8 @@ static struct rtnl_link * lookup_sc(stru + + rtnl_link_set_link(needle, parent); + rtnl_link_macsec_set_sci(needle, sci); ++ if (cs) ++ rtnl_link_macsec_set_cipher_suite(needle, cs); + + match = nl_cache_find(cache, (struct nl_object *) needle); + rtnl_link_put(needle); +@@ -1098,6 +1110,7 @@ static int macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc + char *ifname; + u64 sci; + int err; ++ u64 cs = 0; + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, DRV_PREFIX + "%s: create_transmit_sc -> " SCISTR " (conf_offset=%d)", +@@ -1122,6 +1135,12 @@ static int macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc + + drv->created_link = true; + ++ if (drv->cipher_suite_set) { ++ cs = drv->cipher_suite; ++ drv->cipher_suite_set = false; ++ rtnl_link_macsec_set_cipher_suite(link, cs); ++ } ++ + err = rtnl_link_add(drv->sk, link, NLM_F_CREATE); + if (err == -NLE_BUSY) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, +@@ -1137,7 +1156,7 @@ static int macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc + rtnl_link_put(link); + + nl_cache_refill(drv->sk, drv->link_cache); +- link = lookup_sc(drv->link_cache, drv->parent_ifi, sci); ++ link = lookup_sc(drv->link_cache, drv->parent_ifi, sci, cs); + if (!link) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, DRV_PREFIX "couldn't find link"); + return -1; diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch b/wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5755cd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +From 6d24673ab89d9002990ee51e7c87d308ca07cd01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +Message-ID: <6d24673ab89d9002990ee51e7c87d308ca07cd01.1706279162.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com> +From: Emeel Hakim +Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 10:26:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] mka: Allow configuration of MACsec hardware offload + +Add new configuration parameter macsec_offload to allow user to set up +MACsec hardware offload feature. + +Signed-off-by: Emeel Hakim +--- + hostapd/config_file.c | 10 ++++++++++ + hostapd/hostapd.conf | 8 ++++++++ + src/ap/ap_config.h | 13 +++++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c | 1 + + src/drivers/driver.h | 10 ++++++++++ + src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c | 7 +++++++ + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 7 +++++-- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 6 ++++-- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 12 ++++++++++++ + wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 8 ++++++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 9 +++++++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 10 +++++++++- + 17 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h ++++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h +@@ -833,6 +833,19 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config { + u32 macsec_replay_window; + + /** ++ * macsec_offload - Enable MACsec offload ++ * ++ * This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e., ++ * - macsec_policy is enabled ++ * - the key server has decided to enable MACsec ++ * ++ * 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF (default) ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ */ ++ int macsec_offload; ++ ++ /** + * macsec_port - MACsec port (in SCI) + * + * Port component of the SCI. +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_kay.c +@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm_hapd(struct + res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_protect, + hapd->conf->macsec_replay_window, ++ hapd->conf->macsec_offload, + hapd->conf->macsec_port, + hapd->conf->mka_priority, + hapd->conf->macsec_csindex, +--- a/src/drivers/driver.h ++++ b/src/drivers/driver.h +@@ -4168,6 +4168,16 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops { + int (*set_replay_protect)(void *priv, bool enabled, u32 window); + + /** ++ * set_offload - Set MACsec hardware offload ++ * @priv: Private driver interface data ++ * @offload: 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported) ++ */ ++ int (*set_offload)(void *priv, u8 offload); ++ ++ /** + * set_current_cipher_suite - Set current cipher suite + * @priv: Private driver interface data + * @cs: EUI64 identifier +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c +@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm { + + /* not defined IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 */ + struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay; ++ u8 offload; + }; + + static void ieee802_1x_cp_retire_when_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, +@@ -188,6 +189,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, AUTHENTICATED) + sm->protect_frames = false; + sm->replay_protect = false; + sm->validate_frames = Checked; ++ sm->offload = sm->kay->macsec_offload; + + sm->port_valid = false; + sm->controlled_port_enabled = true; +@@ -197,6 +199,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, AUTHENTICATED) + secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt); + secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames); + secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(sm->kay, sm->offload); + } + + +@@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, SECURED) + + sm->protect_frames = sm->kay->macsec_protect; + sm->replay_protect = sm->kay->macsec_replay_protect; ++ sm->offload = sm->kay->macsec_offload; + sm->validate_frames = sm->kay->macsec_validate; + + sm->current_cipher_suite = sm->cipher_suite; +@@ -223,6 +227,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, SECURED) + secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt); + secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames); + secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(sm->kay, sm->offload); + } + + +@@ -462,6 +467,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + sm->validate_frames = kay->macsec_validate; + sm->replay_protect = kay->macsec_replay_protect; + sm->replay_window = kay->macsec_replay_window; ++ sm->offload = kay->macsec_offload; + + sm->controlled_port_enabled = false; + +@@ -491,6 +497,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_ + secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(sm->kay, + sm->confidentiality_offset); + secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(sm->kay, sm->current_cipher_suite); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(sm->kay, sm->offload); + + SM_STEP_RUN(CP); + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c +@@ -3464,8 +3464,8 @@ static void kay_l2_receive(void *ctx, co + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, +- const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) ++ u8 macsec_offload, u16 port, u8 priority, ++ u32 macsec_csindex, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr) + { + struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay; + +@@ -3524,6 +3524,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_ka + kay->macsec_validate = Disabled; + kay->macsec_replay_protect = false; + kay->macsec_replay_window = 0; ++ kay->macsec_offload = 0; + kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_NONE; + kay->mka_hello_time = MKA_HELLO_TIME; + } else { +@@ -3540,6 +3541,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_ka + kay->macsec_validate = Strict; + kay->macsec_replay_protect = macsec_replay_protect; + kay->macsec_replay_window = macsec_replay_window; ++ kay->macsec_offload = macsec_offload; + kay->mka_hello_time = MKA_HELLO_TIME; + } + +@@ -3740,6 +3742,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka(struct ieee802 + secy_cp_control_protect_frames(kay, kay->macsec_protect); + secy_cp_control_replay(kay, kay->macsec_replay_protect, + kay->macsec_replay_window); ++ secy_cp_control_offload(kay, kay->macsec_offload); + if (secy_create_transmit_sc(kay, participant->txsc)) + goto fail; + +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h +@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx { + int (*delete_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa); + int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa); + int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa); ++ int (*set_offload)(void *ctx, u8 offload); + }; + + struct ieee802_1x_kay { +@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay { + bool is_key_server; + bool is_obliged_key_server; + char if_name[IFNAMSIZ]; ++ u8 macsec_offload; + + unsigned int macsec_csindex; /* MACsec cipher suite table index */ + int mka_algindex; /* MKA alg table index */ +@@ -240,8 +242,8 @@ u64 mka_sci_u64(struct ieee802_1x_mka_sc + struct ieee802_1x_kay * + ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy, + bool macsec_replay_protect, u32 macsec_replay_window, +- u16 port, u8 priority, u32 macsec_csindex, +- const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); ++ u8 macsec_offload, u16 port, u8 priority, ++ u32 macsec_csindex, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr); + void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay); + + struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant * +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c +@@ -85,6 +85,26 @@ int secy_cp_control_replay(struct ieee80 + } + + ++int secy_cp_control_offload(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u8 offload) ++{ ++ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops; ++ ++ if (!kay) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ ops = kay->ctx; ++ if (!ops || !ops->set_offload) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "KaY: secy set_offload operation not supported"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ return ops->set_offload(ops->ctx, offload); ++} ++ ++ + int secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u64 cs) + { + struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops; +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ int secy_cp_control_validate_frames(stru + int secy_cp_control_protect_frames(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, bool flag); + int secy_cp_control_encrypt(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, bool enabled); + int secy_cp_control_replay(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, bool flag, u32 win); ++int secy_cp_control_offload(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u8 offload); + int secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u64 cs); + int secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, + enum confidentiality_offset co); +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2610,6 +2610,7 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fiel + { INT_RANGE(macsec_integ_only, 0, 1) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_replay_protect, 0, 1) }, + { INT(macsec_replay_window) }, ++ { INT_RANGE(macsec_offload, 0, 2) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_port, 1, 65534) }, + { INT_RANGE(mka_priority, 0, 255) }, + { INT_RANGE(macsec_csindex, 0, 1) }, +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c +@@ -808,6 +808,7 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FIL + INT(macsec_integ_only); + INT(macsec_replay_protect); + INT(macsec_replay_window); ++ INT(macsec_offload); + INT(macsec_port); + INT_DEF(mka_priority, DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER); + INT(macsec_csindex); +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h +@@ -896,6 +896,18 @@ struct wpa_ssid { + u32 macsec_replay_window; + + /** ++ * macsec_offload - Enable MACsec hardware offload ++ * ++ * This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e., ++ * - the key server has decided to enable MACsec ++ * ++ * 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF (default) ++ * 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++ * 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++ */ ++ int macsec_offload; ++ ++ /** + * macsec_port - MACsec port (in SCI) + * + * Port component of the SCI. +--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h +@@ -804,6 +804,14 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_set_replay_pro + window); + } + ++static inline int wpa_drv_set_offload(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u8 offload) ++{ ++ if (!wpa_s->driver->set_offload) ++ return -1; ++ return wpa_s->driver->set_offload(wpa_s->drv_priv, offload); ++ ++} ++ + static inline int wpa_drv_set_current_cipher_suite(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + u64 cs) + { +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c +@@ -1473,6 +1473,7 @@ static const char *network_fields[] = { + "macsec_integ_only", + "macsec_replay_protect", + "macsec_replay_window", ++ "macsec_offload", + "macsec_port", + "mka_priority", + #endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */ +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1094,6 +1094,15 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # 0: No replay window, strict check (default) + # 1..2^32-1: number of packets that could be misordered + # ++# macsec_offload - Enable MACsec hardware offload ++# ++# This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e., ++# - the key server has decided to enable MACsec ++# ++# 0 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF (default) ++# 1 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_PHY ++# 2 = MACSEC_OFFLOAD_MAC ++# + # macsec_port: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec port + # Port component of the SCI + # Range: 1-65534 (default: 1) +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c +@@ -98,6 +98,12 @@ static int wpas_set_receive_lowest_pn(vo + } + + ++static int wpas_set_offload(void *wpa_s, u8 offload) ++{ ++ return wpa_drv_set_offload(wpa_s, offload); ++} ++ ++ + static unsigned int conf_offset_val(enum confidentiality_offset co) + { + switch (co) { +@@ -220,6 +226,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_s + kay_ctx->enable_protect_frames = wpas_enable_protect_frames; + kay_ctx->enable_encrypt = wpas_enable_encrypt; + kay_ctx->set_replay_protect = wpas_set_replay_protect; ++ kay_ctx->set_offload = wpas_set_offload; + kay_ctx->set_current_cipher_suite = wpas_set_current_cipher_suite; + kay_ctx->enable_controlled_port = wpas_enable_controlled_port; + kay_ctx->get_receive_lowest_pn = wpas_get_receive_lowest_pn; +@@ -240,7 +247,8 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_s + kay_ctx->disable_transmit_sa = wpas_disable_transmit_sa; + + res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, ssid->macsec_replay_protect, +- ssid->macsec_replay_window, ssid->macsec_port, ++ ssid->macsec_replay_window, ++ ssid->macsec_offload, ssid->macsec_port, + ssid->mka_priority, ssid->macsec_csindex, + wpa_s->ifname, wpa_s->own_addr); + /* ieee802_1x_kay_init() frees kay_ctx on failure */ diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch b/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c646a30 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 763a4ef660e2bd81f6cdc71a2f29a0a3e71b2ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dan Williams +Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 15:48:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] quiet an annoying and frequent syslog message + +--- + wpa_supplicant/events.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/events.c b/wpa_supplicant/events.c +index abe3b47..72a0412 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/events.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/events.c +@@ -1555,11 +1555,11 @@ static int _wpa_supplicant_event_scan_results(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + if (wpa_s->last_scan_req == MANUAL_SCAN_REQ && + wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id && wpa_s->own_scan_running && + own_request && !(data && data->scan_info.external_scan)) { +- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u", ++ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u", + wpa_s->manual_scan_id); + wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id = 0; + } else { +- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS); ++ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS); + } + wpas_notify_scan_results(wpa_s); + +-- +2.9.3 + diff --git a/wpa_supplicant.spec b/wpa_supplicant.spec index f2172c6..ece151d 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant.spec +++ b/wpa_supplicant.spec @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -%define anolis_release 3 +%define anolis_release 5 %global _hardened_build 1 Summary: WPA/WPA2/IEEE 802.1X Supplicant @@ -13,6 +13,31 @@ Source2: wpa_supplicant.service Source3: wpa_supplicant.sysconfig Source4: wpa_supplicant.logrotate +# distro specific customization and not suitable for upstream, +Patch0: wpa_supplicant-config.patch +# works around busted drivers +Patch1: wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch +# ensures that debug output gets flushed immediately to help diagnose driver +# bugs, not suitable for upstream +Patch2: wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch +# quiet an annoying and frequent syslog message +Patch3: wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch +# distro specific customization for Qt4 build tools, not suitable for upstream +Patch4: wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch +# backport fix for bz2063730 +Patch5: 0001-D-Bus-Add-wep_disabled-capability.patch +# backport fix for bz2077973 +Patch6: 0001-EAP-peer-Workaround-for-servers-that-do-not-support-.patch +Patch7: 0001-EAP-peer-status-notification-for-server-not-supporti.patch +# support macsec HW offload +Patch8: wpa_supplicant-MACsec-Support-GCM-AES-256-cipher-suite.patch +Patch9: wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Support-cipher-suite-configuration.patch +Patch10: wpa_supplicant-mka-Allow-configuration-of-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch +Patch11: wpa_supplicant-macsec_linux-Add-support-for-MACsec-hardware-offload.patch + +# fix PEAP client to require successful Phase2 authentication when needed (CVE-2023-52160) +Patch12: wpa_supplicant-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch + URL: http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/ BuildRequires: openssl-devel @@ -92,7 +117,6 @@ rm -f wpa_supplicant/doc/.cvsignore rm -rf wpa_supplicant/doc/docbook chmod -R 0644 wpa_supplicant/examples/*.py - %post %systemd_post wpa_supplicant.service @@ -142,6 +166,9 @@ chmod -R 0644 wpa_supplicant/examples/*.py %doc wpa_supplicant/todo.txt %changelog +* Thu Jun 27 2024 wangce - 1:2.10-5 +- update 2.10-5 + * Fri Dec 16 2022 Chunmei Xu - 1:2.10-3 - fix wrong requires of doc -- Gitee